Software supply chain security has emerged as a critical domain within cybersecurity research and enterprise practices due to the increasing complexity of interconnected software ecosystems and the proliferation of dependency networks. This research article provides an in-depth theoretical and empirical synthesis of supply chain risk vectors, with an emphasis on third‑party component vulnerabilities, dependency freshness, automated malicious package detection, and holistic risk management frameworks. Drawing on prolific work in software supply chain risk assessment (Croll et al.), open source trust paradoxes (Silic & Back), and empirical analyses of ecosystem vulnerabilities (Delamore & Ko; Decan et al.), this research scrutinizes both systemic and component‑level risk dynamics that threaten software integrity. We explore supply chain risk management foundations, interrogate real‑world attack case studies such as malicious npm packages and backdoored Docker images, and articulate the role of software bill of materials (SBOM) in supply chain transparency. Furthermore, we revisit dependency freshness and outdated workflows as persistent challenges in ecosystem hygiene, integrating perspectives on vulnerability datasets and advanced detection techniques. Our contribution contextualizes existing research within a unified narrative that elucidates theoretical underpinnings, identifies persistent gaps, and proposes an integrated, resilient software supply chain security model, emphasizing rigorous monitoring, automated detection, governance frameworks, and future research trajectories.

Software Supply Chain Security, Dependencies, Vulnerability Management, SBOM

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